Corrupt DNS Packets
The DNS protocol specifies data sizes for queries and replies. Some DNS implementations do not properly check data boundaries. A packet may claim to have more data than it actually contains or may not contain enough data. These can result in buffer overflows and underflows.
Similarly, the DNS data fields can contain codes for jumping within the packet. This shorthand permits repeat domain names to be reused rather than duplicated in the packet. A misconfigured jump can result in an overflow or infinite processing loop (when the jump leads to itself).
Although most of today's DNS hosts are not vulnerable to these exploits, new network devices are released often. Many new devices rely on DNS for name lookups but implement their own version of the protocol rather than porting a vetted DNS library. These unique implementations are commonly vulnerable to malformed DNS packets.
In this tutorial:
- Domain Name System (DNS)
- DNS Common Uses
- Hostname-to-Address Mapping
- Common Lookup Tools
- Naming Confusion Attack Vectors
- Dotted Names
- Name Formatting
- Exploited Anonymity
- Mail Servers
- Sender Policy Framework Overloading
- Domain Keys Overloading
- DNS Protocol
- Packet Information
- Simple DNS Server
- Distributed Architecture
- Top Level Domain Servers
- Generic Top Level Domain (gTLD)
- Secondary Level Domain (SLD)
- Primary and Secondary Servers
- Caching Servers
- DNS Management
- DNS Direct Risks
- DNS Performance versus Security
- DNS Cache Poisoning
- Corrupt DNS Packets
- DNS Domain Hijacking
- DNS Server Hijacking
- Dynamic DNS
- Similar Hostnames
- Domain Renewals
- Hostnames
- Zone Transfers
- Host Listing
- DNS Fields
- Mitgation Option
- Technical Threat Mitigation
- Social Threat Mitigation
- Defining Trusted Replies